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1.  Opening remarks 
 
No one could seriously doubt that respect for dignity is closely con-
nected to the banning of slavery, as well as the banning of torture and 
human and degrading treatments. In spite of this, such a conclusion is 
less trivial than it may appear. 
In fact, no reference to dignity is made either by the 1926 Conven-
tion on Slavery1 (at variance with the preamble of the so-called 1956 
Supplementary Convention2), or by the 1930 Convention on the Elimi-
nation of Forced Labour.3 
Dignity made its appearance in the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR),4 albeit not being provided with a precise defi-
nition, as a consequence of two basic circumstances. Indeed, it was 
clearly perceived that crimes committed by Nazis amounted precisely to 
an extreme denial of human dignity, and invoking dignity was therefore 
 
* Full Professor of International Law, Catholic University of Milan. 
1 ‘Slavery Convention’, signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926 <www.un.org/en/ 
genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.13_slavery%20conv.pdf>. 
2 ‘Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and In-
stitutions and Practices Similar to Slavery’, adopted by a Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries convened by Economic and Social Council resolution 608(XXI) of 30 April 1956 
and done at Geneva on 7 September 1956 <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Professional 
Interest/slaverytrade.pdf>. 
3 ‘Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour’ (‘Forced Labour Con-
vention’, 1930 (No 29)) adopted on 28 June 1930 <www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/ 
en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C029>. 
4 References to dignity appear: a) in the Preamble of the UDHR (dignity is consid-
ered both as the ‘[…] foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world […]’ and 
the object of a common ‘faith’ of the ‘peoples of the United Nations’, b) in art 1, ac-
cording to which ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’; c) in 
two other articles (art 22, right to social security; art 23, para 3, right to work).  
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considered as the most appropriate reaction to such denial.5 Further-
more, it was precisely the fact that dignity was not provided with a spe-
cific legal meaning both in the United Nations Charter and in the Dec-
laration that rendered it able to reconcile different political stances.6  
Reflecting on the role of dignity with respect to slavery and new 
slaveries requires, first of all, that a very brief reflection is carried out on 
the legal meaning of the notion at stake in general terms. On this basis, 
some remarks will be developed with specific regard to the role played 
by dignity concerning new slaveries. It is worth noting right now that 
such a role is far from being insignificant. 
 
 
2.  Legal meanings of dignity: the idea of dignity as a minimum standard 
of treatment … 
 
Of course, it is not even possible to sketch here a global discussion 
on the legal meaning and the legal status of dignity in international law.7 
 
5 J Morsink, ‘World War Two and the Universal Declaration’ (1993) 15 Human 
Rights Quarterly 357 ff, 362. 
6  Such a circumstance is stressed by C McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial 
Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 European J Intl L 655 ff, 678. 
7 To tell the truth, the above aspects are usually not dealt with by international law 
scholars, apart from C Le Bris L’humanité saisie par le droit international public (LGDJ 
2012) 101 ff, JA Frowein, ‘Human Dignity in International Law’ in D Kretzmer, E Klein 
(eds), The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Right Discourse (Kluwer Law 
International 2002) 121 ff, K Dicke, ‘The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ ibid 111 ff, O Schachter, ‘Human Dignity as a 
Normative Concept’ (1983) 77 AJIL 848 ff and A Verdross, ‘La dignité de la personne 
humaine, base des Droits de l’Homme’ (1980)  31 Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 271 ff; dignity is normally investigated by 
constitutional law scholars (A Barak, Human Dignity. The Constitutional Value and the 
Constitutional Right, Cambridge (CUP 2015); C Dupré, The Age of Dignity. Human 
Rights and Constitutionalism in Europe (Hart 2015), S Hennette Vauchez, ‘A Human 
dignitas? Remnants of the Ancient Legal Concept in Contemporary Dignity 
Jurisprudence’ (2011) 9 Intl J Constitutional L 32 ff, S Hennette Vauchez, ‘Une dignitas 
humaine? Vieilles outres, vin nouveau’ (2008) 48 Droits 59 ff), human rights judges (JP 
Costa, ‘Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
in C McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (OUP 2014) 393 ff), legal 
theorists (J Tasioulas, ‘Human Dignity and the Foundations of Human Rights’, in C 
McCrudden (ed), Understanding Human Dignity (OUP 2014) 291-313; B De Gaay 
Fortman, ‘Equal Dignity in International Human Rights’, in M Düwell, J Braarvig, R 
Brownsword, D Mieth (eds), The Cambridge Handbook on Human Dignity (CUP 2014) 




A similar attempt would be manifestly pretentious and no significant 
result could be achieved in this way. 
In spite of this, one may easily argue that both international law 
scholars and legal theorists display a tendency, starting from the UDHR 
and the UN Charter, to conclude that dignity would be a sort of empty 
notion under international law. According to Schachter, for example, 
dignity could be considered as no more than ‘an ideal that has not yet 
been given substantial specific content’, and therefore one could simply 
suggest some ‘[…] examples of conduct and ideas antithetical to or in-
compatible with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’.8 
More recently, an analogous stance is taken by McCrudden, accord-
ing to whom dignity would however play three important ‘institutional’ 
roles in the framework of the judicial interpretation of human rights … 
precisely as a consequence of it not being provided with a definite legal 
meaning.9  
First of all, dignity would be able to provide a ‘[…] language in 
which courts can indicate the weighting given to particular rights and 
other values […]’ in the context of a proportionality test.10 To be more 
precise, in Mc Crudden’s opinion, ‘[w]hen a particular right or other 
value is described as engaging dignity, this indicates that the court con-
siders that considerable (even in some cases overwhelming) weight 
should be attributed to it’.11  
Secondly, having recourse to dignity would enable domestic jurisdic-
tions – particularly during the transition to democracy of Eastern Euro-
pean countries – ‘to develop [their] own practice of human rights’, al-
beit on the basis of universal principles of international law.12  
Lastly, dignity would also function ‘as a source from which new 
rights may be derived, and existing rights extended’ within the case law 
concerning human rights.13 
 
355-36, J Waldron, Dignity, Rank and Rights, (OUP 2012), C McCrudden, ‘Human 
Dignity in Human Rights Interpretation’ (n 6). 
8 Schachter, ‘Human Dignity as a Normative Concept’ (n 7) 852. 
9 McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (n 6) 
713. 
10 ibid 716. 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid 720. 
13 ibid 721.  
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Be that as it may, concluding that dignity is devoid of a definite legal 
meaning is somewhat misleading. In other words, it seems to me that 
such a conclusion simply reflects the difficulty of conceptualising the 
different meanings that dignity is likely to take on in the relevant prac-
tice. Among these different meanings, which cannot be dealt with in 
depth here,14 the idea according to which respect for dignity implies a 
minimum standard to be observed for the treatment of individuals (who 




3.  … and its roots 
 
Such an idea – which entails that States have to secure the effective 
enjoyment of this standard of treatment, also by avoiding that private 
individuals may infringe it – has its roots in two circumstances at least. 
I refer, first, to common Article 3, para 1, of the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions on humanitarian law, applicable to international and non- 
international armed conflict. It is well known that this provision, in ad-
dition to the bans  on ‘murder’, ‘torture’ and ‘cruel treatments’, also 
prohibits ‘humiliating and degrading treatment’, by expressly defining 
the latter as ‘outrages upon personal dignity’.15 It is therefore manifestly 
evident that respect for dignity constitutes the rationale of all the above 
bans. However, what matters most is that these bans, taken as a whole, 
are precisely aimed at guaranteeing a minimum standard of treatment 
for individuals in enemy hands, namely under the power of (foreign) 
public authorities. 
As to the second relevant circumstance, suffice it to recall the wide-
spread tendency to consider respect for dignity as the legal ground for 
both the ban on torture and cruel and degrading treatment and that of 
 
14 A tentative, comprehensive legal analysis of these meanings is carried out in P De 
Sena, ‘Dignité humaine et droit international’ forthcoming in Recueil des Cours de 
l’Académie de Droit International. 
15 ‘[…] the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any 
place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: a) violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b) tak-
ing of hostages; c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and de-
grading treatment […]’. 




slavery; ie two bans that are commonly considered as forming part of 
the hard core (‘noyau dur’) of international human rights. 
Such a tendency clearly emerges from the very fact that it is precise-
ly by having recourse to dignity that both the bans on slavery and com-
pulsory labour, and torture or inhuman and degrading treatments, have 
been extended to factual hypotheses which are not expressly covered by 
the corresponding rules. Leaving aside torture and degrading treatment, 
two judgments of the European Court of Human Rights may be re-
called here with respect to slavery and forced and compulsory labour: 
Siliadin v France16 and Rantsev v Russia and Cyprus17 In both these 
judgments, references to respect for dignity were made by the Court in 
order to trace back forms of servitude or serious exploitation of labour 
and trafficking of human persons, respectively, to Article 4 of the Con-
vention.  
In Siliadin, the case of a domestic servant who worked 15 hours a 
day, without a day off or pay for several years, came to the fore. Alt-
hough Articles 225-13 and 225-14 of the French Criminal Code ‘make it 
an offence, respectively, to exploit an individual's labour and to submit 
him or her to working or living conditions that are incompatible with 
human dignity’,18 the Court granted the application, by arguing that re-
spect for human dignity of Ms Siliadin would have required the adop-
tion of specific (legislative) provisions dealing with treatment contrary to 
Article 4 of the Convention which she complained about.19 
In Rantsev, the reference to human dignity made by the Strasbourg 
judges appears to be even clearer and more significant. In that case, the 
Court was called upon to rule on the extension of the scope of applica-
tion of Article 4 to trafficking of human beings, and the application was 
granted precisely on account that ‘[t]here can be no doubt that traffick-
ing threatens the human dignity and fundamental freedoms of its vic-
 
16 Siliadin v France, App no 73316/01 (ECtHR, 26 October 2005). 
17 Rantsev v Russia and Cyprus, App no 25965/04 (ECtHR, 7 January 2010). 
18 Siliadin (n 16) para 142. 
19 ibid paras 143 ff; in other words, the Court held that the French criminal law 
which was in force at that time did not offer the applicant an effective protection against 
‘servitude’ or, at least, against ‘forced and compulsory labour’, both of them being con-
sidered as violations of dignity. 
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tims’.20 Subsequently, positive obligations stemming from the said arti-
cle were held to be violated by both the respondent States.21 
Furthermore, it is to be added that neither in Siliadin, nor in 




4.  Dignity as a general principle of law concerning new forms of slavery: 
Katanga, Kunarac and Trabajadores de la Hacienda Brazil Verde   
 
Having established that dignity refers, inter alia, to a minimum 
standard of treatment to be guaranteed to individuals placed under the 
power of public authorities or other private individuals, another ques-
tion to be dealt with is the legal function to be recognized to such a no-
tion. 
Making use of dignity in order to extend the scope of application of 
the ban at stake also sheds light upon this question. In other words, 
having recourse to dignity for this purpose means nothing less – and 
nothing more – than using dignity as a general principle of law. In fact, 
the gap-filling function, performed by dignity22 with specific respect to 
slavery, undoubtedly constitutes a typical function of general principles 
of law. 
An important confirmation of the foregoing is given by the judg-
ment rendered by a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in Katanga23 (2014), as well as the well-known judgment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 
Kunarac24 (2001). 
 
20 Rantsev (n 17) para 282; the above conclusion was reached, regardless of whether 
‘the treatment about which the applicant complains constitutes ‘slavery’, ‘servitude’ or 
‘forced and compulsory labour.’ (ibid).  
21 ibid paras 293, 298, 300 (Cyprus) and paras 303, 306, 309 (Russia).  
22 Understood as a minimum standard of treatment for individuals placed under 
the power of public authorities or other private individuals. 
23 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v 
Germain Katanga (Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/07 (7 
March 2014). 
24 Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Judgment) 
IT-96-23-T& IT-96-23/1-T (22 February 2001). 




In both these cases, the question of enslavement came to the fore, 
and in both of them, enslavement – as it occurred in Rantsev and Sili-
adin25 – was considered as not implying ownership in the strict sense, 
namely as ‘acquisition’ or ‘disposal’ of persons for monetary or other 
compensation.  
In Katanga, the ICC, starting from the premise that ownership may 
take many forms, including ‘a situation of dependence which entails 
[the individual’s] deprivation of any form of autonomy’,26 expressly 
concluded that ‘[t]he use of threats, force or other forms of physical or 
mental coercion, the exaction of forced labour, the exertion of psycho-
logical pressure, the victim’s vulnerability and the socioeconomic condi-
tions in which the power is exerted may also be taken into account’, 
given ‘that the exercise of the right of ownership over someone need not 
entail a commercial transaction’.27 
Similar conclusions had already been reached by ICTY in Kunarac 
at the beginning of 2000s. Suffice it to consider that according to the 
Tribunal ‘the consent or free will of the victim’ are often nullified ‘by, 
for example, the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion; the 
fear of violence, deception or false promises; the abuse of power; the 
victim’s position of vulnerability, detention or captivity, psychological 
oppression or socio-economic conditions’,28 although this way of con-
struing the concept of enslavement ends up being broader than the tra-
ditional definitions of slavery, slave trade, etc.29 
That being said, it has also to be pointed out that in these judgments 
no explicit references are made to dignity in order to extend the notion 
of enslavement. In spite of this, no one could seriously question that the 
need to take into account the dignity of victims of the alleged crimes30 
led the above tribunals to state that enslavement also occurs in case of 
‘psychological oppression’, ‘control of movement’, ‘threat of force’, etc. 
 
25 See above, section 3. 
26 Katanga (n 23) para 975. 
27 ibid 976 (italics added); in this affair the Court was called upon to rule on a case 
of sexual slavery. 
28 Kunarac (n 26) para 543. 
29 ibid para 541 (for an in-depth analysis of the legal history of enslavement under 
international law: paras 515-539).  
30 Understood as the guarantee of a minimum standard of treatment. 
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In addition, the above circumstances have also been deemed rele-
vant for enslavement in the judgment Trabajadores de la Hacienda Brazil 
Verde v Brazil31 rendered by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR) in 2016. In this case, the applicants – 85 workers in a 
privately-owned estate, among whom some children – claimed to be vic-
tims of slavery, on account of their working conditions, under Article 6, 
para 1 of the Convention.32 Their application was granted by the Court, 
precisely by arguing that deception, fraud, control of movement, physi-
cal and psychological forms of coercion against vulnerable persons 
amounted to a ‘situation of slavery’ (‘situación de esclavitud’),33 not-
withstanding that such a situation did not entail that victims could be 
considered as being property stricto sensu of an owner, here either.34 It 
is worth noting that the Court did not fail to stress that slavery repre-
sents a major violation of dignity,35 being able to subsume other viola-
tions equally alleged by the applicants.36   
 
 
5.  …and some recent judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights  
 
Further and even more significant confirmation of the role played 
by dignity as a general principle can also be found in the recent case law 
of the European Court concerning new forms of slaveries. 
In addition to Rantsev,37 a very recent judgment rendered by the 
Court in S.M. v Croatia38 is to be pointed out here. In this judgment, a 
case of forced prostitution – concerning a young Croatian woman, 
 
31 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Tabajadores de la Hacienda Brazil Verde 
v Brazil (IACtHR, 20 October 2016). 
32 They were recruited by fraud and deceit, and subsequently subjected to debt 
bondage; furthermore, their working conditions were inhuman and they were not free 
to leave the work place. 
33 Tabajadores de la Hacienda Brazil Verde (n 31) para 304. 
34 ibid see paras 269-272 for an in-depth analysis of the pertinent case law. 
35 ibid para 317: ‘Asimismo, la prohibición a no ser sometido a esclavitud juega un 
papel fundamental en la Convención Americana, por representar una de las violaciones 
más fundamentales de la dignidad de la persona humana y, concomitantemente, de va-
rios derechos de la Convención.’ (italics added).   
36 ibid para 306. 
37 See above, section 3. 
38 S.M. v Croatia, App no 60561/14 (ECtHR, 19 July 2018). 




forced to prostitute by a former police officer – came to the fore. In 
spite of its purely domestic character, the crime at stake has been 
considered as amounting to trafficking and, therefore, as being a 
violation of Article 4 of the Convention;39 subsequently, Croatia was 
found responsible for not fulfilling procedural obligations stemming 
from the above provision.40 Such a conclusion was reached precisely by 
deeming trafficking and sexual exploitation violations of human dignity, 
regardless of whether these treatments constituted ‘slavery’, ‘servitude’ 
or ‘forced and compulsory labour’,41 and regardless of the fact that no 
ownership over the victim occurred in this case. 
In a similar vein, one may also recall the judgment L.E. v Greece,42 
adopted by the European Court in 2016. Even in this judgment, 
recourse to dignity was made with the aim of justifying the extension of 
Article 4 to a case of trafficking concerning a young Nigerian woman 
who had been forced into prostitution after entering Greek territory.43 
Moreover, even in this case, dignity played the role of enabling the 
Court to extend Article 4 to factual situations which do not amount to 
ownership stricto sensu.44 
Lastly, it is once again the need to protect the dignity of the 
applicants that was at stake in Chowdury v Greece.45 By means of this 
important judgment, the European Court has got to the point of stating 
that in some cases ‘exploitation through work’ amounts to trafficking, 
being therefore covered by Article 4 of the Convention.46 For the sake 
of precision, in Chowdury the Court was dealing with some Bangladeshi 
migrants who were obliged to work without being paid in order to 
repay travel expenses, and also unable to move because of being 
 
39 ibid para 54. 
40 ibid paras 73-81. 
41 ibid para 54: ‘There can be no doubt that trafficking and exploitation of prostitu-
tion threatens the human dignity and fundamental freedoms of its victims and cannot be 
considered compatible with a democratic society and the values expounded in the Con-
vention. In view of its obligation to interpret the Convention in the light of present-day 
conditions, the Court considers it unnecessary to identify whether the treatment of 
which the applicant complained constituted “slavery”, “servitude” or “forced and com-
pulsory labour”. […]’ (italics added). 
42 L.E. v Greece, App no 71545/12 (ECtHR, 21 January 2016). 
43 ibid para 58. 
44 As far as trafficking does not imply ownership ‘stricto sensu over the victim. 
45 Chowdury and others v Greece, App no 21884/15 (ECtHR, 30 March 2017). 
46 ibid para 93. 
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irregular as well as deprived of their personal documents.47 Not only is 
dignity expressly referred to in this judgment,48 but also such a 
reference is all the more important, given that the above factual 
situation keeps repeating again and again in the relevant practice.   
 
 
6.  Final remarks 
 
Summing up, one can easily conclude that dignity – or rather, re-
spect for dignity – plays a very important role with regard to new slaver-
ies understood as all those factual hypotheses in which individuals can-
not be considered as property stricto sensu of an owner. Whether it is 
sexual slavery (Katanga, Kunarac) or servitude (Siliadin), serious exploi-
tation of labour (Trabajadores de la Hacienda Brazil Verde) or trafficking 
of human beings (Rantsev, L.E. and Chowdury), dignity tends some-
times to be invoked for the purpose of making these hypotheses fall 
within the scope of application of existing international rules dealing 
with slavery or enslavement;49 other times, it tends to form part of the 
backdrop for such an interpretative activity.50 
Insofar as recourse to dignity is intended for a similar purpose, it is 
worth repeating that this notion clearly plays the role of a general prin-
ciple of human rights law, being also provided with the corresponding 
legal status. Furthermore, the case law at stake confirms that speaking 
of dignity is a concise way to refer to a minimum standard of treatment 
to be guaranteed to individuals placed under the power of public au-
thorities or other private individuals. 
The very fact that several international courts have had recourse to 
the principle of dignity in order to extend the above standard with re-
spect to new forms of slavery is therefore to be commended. By means 
of dignity the said courts tend therefore to expand the ‘hard core’ of 
human rights, taking into account that the ban on slavery is an essential 
 
47 ibid paras 94-99. 
48 ibid para 93. 
49 I refer to the judgments rendered by both the European and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, respectively in Rantsev (n 17), Siliadin (n 16), S.M. (n 38), L.E 
(n 42), Chowdury (n 45) and Trabajadores de la Hacienda Brazil Verde (n 33). 
50 I refer to the decisions adopted by the ICC and the ICTY, respectively in Katan-
ga (n 23) and Kunarac (n 26). 




part of such a core. Against this, one could hardly invoke the extreme 
vagueness of a similar principle, if one only considers that vagueness is a 
normal feature of the category of general principles of law.   
 
 
 
